David George, Estate of Betty George v. LDS Hospital, Kimball Lloyd, Michael Lahey : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
David George, Estate of Betty George v. LDS
Hospital, Kimball Lloyd, Michael Lahey : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steve Russell, Kathryn P. Collard; Attorneys for Respondent.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton, McConkie and Poelman; Elliot J. Williams, Larry R.
Laycock; J. Anthony Eyre, Michael F. Skolnick; Attorneys for Petitioner.
This Response to Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Certiorari, George v. Lloyd, No. 900502.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3260
D CUM'."NT 
KF'» 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO.. 
BRIEfi 
tfC05Gl>>> 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, individually, and 
as personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF BETTY GEORGE 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
LDS HOSPITAL, KIMBALL LLOYD, 
M.D., and MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D., 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
Case No. 900502 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LDS 
HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Merrill F. Nelson 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1104 
Attorneys for Defendant-Petitioner 
LDS Hospital 
Elliot J. Williams 
Larry R. Laycock 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84145 
Attorneys for Kimball Lloyd, M.D. 
J. Anthony Eyre 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Michael Lahey, M.D. 
Steve Russell (2831) 
Kathryn Collard (0697) 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent David George 
FI 
NOV 3 0 WQfl 
Clerk, Supreme Court. Uah 
.HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, individually, and 
as personal representative of the 
ESTATE OF BETTY GEORGE 
Plaintiff-Re spondent, 
v. 
LDS HOSPITAL, KIMBALL LLOYD, 
M.D., and MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D., 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
Case No. 900502 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LDS 
HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Merrill F. Nelson 
KIRTONf McCONKIE & POELMAN 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1104 
Attorneys for Defendant-Petitioner 
LDS Hospital 
Elliot J. Williams 
Larry R. Laycock 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
 M A R T I N E A U 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Kimball Llov • 
J. Anthony Eyre 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Michael Lahey, M.D. 
Steve Russell (2831) 
Kathryn Collard (0697) 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent David George 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITES iii 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
JURISDICTION 2 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I: NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO GRANT 
CERTIORARI EXISTS IN THIS CASE 4 
POINT II: PETITIONER MATERIALLY MISSTATES OR 
MISUNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES DETERMINED 
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 5 
A. GRANTING LDS HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE SINCE THE 
COURT OF APPEALSDID NOT REACH SEVERAL OF THE 
ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. . . . 8 
POINT III: LDS HOSPITAL'S ARGUMENT ON THE LAW IS 
BOTH IMPROPER AND INCORRECT 10 
A. THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TO GRANT 
CERTIORARI MUST BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 10 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
INSTRUCTIONS 16a AND 21a AS A BASIS FOR 
REVERSAL 11 
Page 
C. LDS HOSPITAL MISSTATES THE LAW REGARDING 
PROOF OF CAUSATION 12 
1. In a Negligence Action Solely Against a 
Hospital Testimony from a Physician on 
Causation is Not Required 12 
2. Plaintiff-Respondent was Entitled to have 
the Jury Instructed on His "Lost Chance of 
Survival" Theory 14 
CONCLUSION 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 18 
APPENDIX 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
STATUTES and RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78 -2 -2 (3) (a) and (5) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-7 10 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 10 
Rules Of The Utah Supreme Court 46 ,49 4 ,10 
Utah R. Civ. P . 51 2 ,12 
CASE LAW 
Aasheim v . Humbercrer. 695 P . 2 d 824, 828 (Mont. 1 9 8 5 ) . . 16 
Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, 
352 S. E. 2d 902, 908-9 (N.C. App. 1987) 13 
Carpet Barn v. State Qf Utah, 786 R.2d 770 
(UT App. 1990) 5 
Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital. 33 111.2d 326, 
211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 1965) 13 
Ehlinger v. Sipesr 155 Wis.2d 1, 454 N.W.2d 754 
(1990) 14,15 
Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773 
(1951) 13 
Georae v. LPS Hospital. 142 UAR 27 (UT App. 1990).2,13,15,17 
Goff v. Doctor's General Hospital, 333 P.2d 29, 33 
(Cal. App. 1958) 13 
Karrinaton v. Nazareth Convenant & Academy. 510 P.2d 190, 
196 (Kan. 1973) 13 
Pacific Chromalox Division v. Treyr 787 P.2d 1319 
(UT App. 1990) 5 
Switzer v. Reynolds. 606 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1980) 10 
Utter v. United Hospital Center. 236 S.E.2d 213, 216 
(W.Va. 1977) 13 
iii 
Page 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Morris, The Negligent Nurse, 33 Baylor L.Rev. 109 (1981). 13 
Restatment (Second) Of Torts §323 (1965) 15 
iv 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Questions Presented By Petitioner: 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed the jury 
verdict of no causation on grounds unrelated to the verdict or the 
issues raised by the parties. 
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that jury 
instructions 16a and 21a regarding proof of negligence and 
proximate cause misstate Utah law and require a new trial. 
Additional Question from Plaintiff-Respondent: 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that 
fundamentally prejudicial rulings throughout the trial, 
instructions requiring the jury to ignore plaintiff's experts' 
testimony and plaintiff's theory of the casef and failure to 
instruct the jury on plaintiff's theory of the case required a new 
trial. 
4. Whether this Court should grant Certiorari. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
LDS Hospital's Petition for Writ of Certiorari challenges the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in George v. LDS Hospital. 
142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 1990). That opinion is appended to this 
memorandum at Appendix pages 1-10. References will be made to the 
Appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals 
decision by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3) (a) and (5) . 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 [App. 26-28] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent filed a negligence action against Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and LDS Hospital. A settlement 
was reached with the physicians prior to trial. At trial, 
plaintiff claimed that the hospital's negligence and failure to 
procure obviously necessary medical care was a substantial factor, 
or contributing proximate cause of the cardiac arrest and 
subsequent death of Betty George. Though "present" at trial, no 
evidence was introduced regarding the physicians' standard of care 
or its breach. 
The jury returned a Special Verdict finding the physicians 
were not negligent, that LDS Hospital was 100% negligent, but that 
said negligence was not the proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George. Plaintiff's Motion for a New trial was denied, and the 
case was appealed. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded for a new trial, finding that fundamentally unfair 
rulings had deprived the plaintiff-respondent of a fair trial, 
that the jury had been improperly instructed to ignore plaintiff's 
expert evidence and theory of the case, and that the jury had been 
improperly instructed on causation. [App.1-10] The verdict of no 
cause of action against the physicians was properly affirmed. 
[Id. at 9] Because of the reversal on these bases, the Court of 
Appeals did not reach other errors claimed by the plaintiff-
respondent. [Id. at 10] 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
P l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t agrees wi th , and i nco rpo ra t e s by 
reference the facts found by the Utah Court of Appeals. [App. 2-
3] 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO GRANT 
CERTIORARI EXISTS IN THIS CASE. 
Under Rule 4 6, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, certiorari is 
a matter of judicial discretion to be granted only when there are 
"special and important reasons" to do so. LDS Hospital contends 
that the Court of Appeals "so far departed from the usual course 
of judicial proceedings" as to require the exercise this Court's 
power of supervision; and that the issues decided by the court of 
appeals were "important questions of first impression" which 
should be settled by this Court. [Brief of Petitioner at 6-7] 
Neither position is accurate. 
LDS Hospital implies that just before leaving the bench, 
Judge Davidson went off on a wild tangent in his final decision, 
and rendered an opinion which was completely foreign to the issues 
before the court of appeals. fnl [Brief of Petitioner at 2] The 
suggestion overlooks the fact that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals was unanimous, with Judge Orme and Judge Bench concurring. 
Nor did the trial of this matter, or its appeal, involve any 
questions of first impression. The case was garden variety 
medical negligence, and not very complicated. No physicians were 
involved, nor did plaintiff-respondent raise any issue involving 
medical diagnosis or treatment. Medical malpractice is simply a 
professional tort, governed by long established legal principles, 
fnl
 LDS hospital also implies that it was prejudiced by Judge Davidson's 
absence at oral argument. LDS Hospital fails to mention that Judge Orme 
stated before argument that Judge Davidson, who would write the decision, 
would be provided tapes of the argument. Petitioner was offered the 
opportunity to argue before a full panel, but declined. 
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and this case was no more than one involving the professional duty 
of hospital staff, its breach, and the result of that breach. 
In any eventf as developed belowf this case was properly 
reversed and remanded, quite apart from any technical legal 
issues, on the basis of fundamental unfair and prejudicial rulings 
of the trial court which deprived plaintiff-respondent of a fair 
trial. 
POINT II: PETITIONER MATERIALLY MISSTATES OR 
MISUNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES 
DETERMINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
It is axiomatic, that each party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on its theory of the case if there is evidence to 
support it. Pacific Chroroalox Division v. lreyf 787 p.2d 1319 
(Utah App. 1990); Carpet Sam v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah 
App. 1990). The decision of the court of appeals in this case, 
correctly distilled, was that the jury was prohibited from 
considering plaintiff-respondent's theory of liability, when the 
trial court added instructions 16a and 21a. [App.6-9] Reversible 
error was manifest since those instructions fundamentally altered 
the plaintiff-respondent's burden of proof after both parties had 
rested. Plaintiff-respondent's theory for the hospital's 
liability had been completely accepted by the district court 
throughout the trial. Plaintiff-respondent's experts had been 
duly qualified and allowed to present evidence on duty, breach and 
causation. The last-minute instructions required the jury to 
ignore plaintiff-respondent's expert testimony, and much of his 
evidence. [App.6-7] 
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Rather than having "totally missed the major issue" [Brief of 
Petitioner at 8], the decision of the Court of Appeals goes right 
to the heart of the matter, specifically, that plaintiff-appellant 
was denied a fair trial. The relevant facts, briefly stated are 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff-respondent's case at trial was solely 
against LDS Hospital and its nursing and respiratory therapy 
staff; 
2. Plaintiff-respondent's called a nurse and 
respiratory therapist who were duly qualified as experts to 
testify regarding duty, breach of duty, and proximate cause. 
3. The trial court ruled repeatedly during the trial 
that the proximate cause of Betty George's death on August 4, 
198 6, as opposed to the cause of her cardiac arrest on August 2, 
1986, was irrelevant. [App. at 6, fn.3] 
4. The trial court specifically ruled, and instructed 
all counsel that it would permit no experts to be called on the 
issue of proximate cause of death. [Id., see alsof App. 11-16, 
which is Addendum II from plaintiff-respondent's opening brief 
before the court of appeals. This addendum sets forth the trial 
court's rulings verbatim, from the record.] 
5. The trial court, over plaintiff-respondent's 
objections, subsequently permitted completely speculative 
testimony from three defense experts on that very issue. [App.7-
8] 
6. On the last day of trial, after both sides had 
rested, the trial court inserted instruction 16a, which had been 
specifically rejected the day before, and the previously unheard 
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of instruction 21a. These required plaintiff-respondent to prove 
proximate cause of death through the testimony of a physician or 
lose. [App.17-19] 
Contrary to petitioner's implication, the court of appeals 
decision was based precisely on the major issue before it. The 
decision states: 
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot 
testify about an area of medicine in which he or 
she is not personally familiar. The record clearly 
indicates, however, that Gillerman and Owings 
testified only to the standards of care in their 
respective fields. The trial court recognized 
these witnesses as experts and admitted their 
testimony, yet the court, through the jury 
instructions, prevented the jury from considering 
their testimony. [App.6] 
The testimony of these experts completely covered plaintiff-
respondent's burden of proof, including the standard of care, its 
breach and damages proximately caused thereby. As the Court of 
Appeals held: 
This error was compounded by the court consistently 
stating throughout the trial that cause of death 
was not an issue in the case and that expert 
testimony need not address that subject, only to 
give the jury instruction focusing on causation as 
established by medical testimony. [Id. at fn.3] 
In a subsequent section of its decision entitled PROXIMATE 
CAUSE, the court of appeals correctly set forth law establishing 
that the question of whether the negligence of a hospital staff 
was a contributing proximate cause of a patient's injuries, is one 
of fact for the jury, then specifically held: 
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the 
failure of the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. 
Lahey of Mrs. George's change in condition 
prevented them from diagnosing, treating and 
possibly saving her life, and that this failure 
therefore was a proximate cause of her worsened 
condition and ensuing death. [App.9] 
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This was exactly the position taken by plaintiff-respondent 
throughout trial and the appeals process, including briefs and 
argument. LDS Hospital plays a game of semantics with its 
position that the court of appeals decision focuses on standard of 
care, rather than the proximate cause. The emphasis placed by the 
court of appeals on the causation issue is patent, and turns on 
the grossly prejudicial instructions which had the effect of 
improperly directing a verdict for LDS Hospital on that issue. 
A. GRANTING LDS HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID 
NOT REACH SEVERAL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT . 
Petitioner claims "there is no basis for a new trial", and 
asks this Court to grant Certiorari to "dispel the confusion" 
supposedly created by the decision of the court of appeals. [Brief 
of Petitioner at 20] As petitioner correctly states however, 
because the Court of Appeals reversed an remanded the case for a 
new trial based on plaintiff-respondent's primary argument [Brief 
of Petitioner at 6], it did not reach other less critical but 
equally reversible errors by the district court. [App.10] For 
that reason, granting certiorari would be improvident since 
numerous issues that were appealed remain unresolved. Far better, 
in terms of both fairness and judicial economy to have the case 
correctly re-tried. The unresolved errors include: 
1. Plaintiff's claim of error that the Special Verdict 
form, provided over plaintiff-respondent's objections, completely 
eliminated any possibility for the jury to consider plaintiff's 
claim of very substantial injuries and damage which occurred prior 
to the death of Betty George. 
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2. The district court's failure to instruct the jury on 
plaintiff-respondent's "increased risk" or "lost chance" theories 
for recovery. 
3. The rejection of plaintiff-respondent's well-
supported position that, under the facts of this casef no expert 
testimony should have been necessary to establish causation 
against the hospital. 
4. The district court's error in allowing the hospital's 
"experts" to testify at all, after having previously ruled that 
such testimony would not be permitted. 
5. Plaintiff-respondent's claim of error that the 
testimony of the hospital's "experts" was completely speculative 
and without foundation. 
6. Plaintiff-respondent's claim that the district court 
erred by failing to direct a verdict in favor of defendants, Dr. 
Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, after the close of the evidence. 
7. Plaintiff-respondent's claim that the district court 
erred by refusing to allow plaintiff an opportunity for rebuttal 
after defendant's closing argument. [See, App.20-21, which is 
plaintiff-respondent's STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, before the court 
of appeals.] 
The first item on this list warrants further comment. 
Plaintiff-respondent introduced extensive unrebutted proof at 
trial that Betty George suffered incredible pain, mental and 
emotional anguish prior to her cardiac arrest on August 2, 1986. 
The jury had no difficulty with the abominable lack of care 
provided by the hospital staff, finding LDS Hospital 100% 
negligent. Plaintiff requested that the jury be allowed to 
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separately determine the damages suffered by Betty George 
personally, which go to the Estate under U.C.A. §78-11-12, from 
the legally distinct damages to her heirs under Utah's wrongful 
death statute. U.C.A. §78-11-7/ See, Switzer v. Reynolds. 606 
P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). 
However, question #3 on the Special Verdict, directed the 
jury to answer no further questions if it answered "no" to the 
question of whether the hospital's negligence was a proximate 
cause of Betty George's death. [App.22-25] The Special verdict 
made it impossible for the jury to award damages for substantial 
pre-death injuries which had been conclusively proved. 
Under these circumstances, any alteration of the order for a 
new trial would constitute a de facto decision on these other 
significant issues not directly decided by the court of appeals. 
Justice, fairness and substantial issues of judicial economy 
require that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied. 
POINT III: LDS HOSPITAL'S ARGUMENT ON THE LAW 
IS BOTH IMPROPER AND INCORRECT. 
LDS Hospital apparently views a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari as an opportunity to re-argue its failed positions on 
appeal. Many issues are improperly raised, and may not be 
included as a basis for granting certiorari. 
A. THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TO GRANT CERTIORARI MUST BE 
STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Rule 4 9 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, sets forth 
the requirements of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The rule 
provides, in relevant part: 
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(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall contain, in the order here 
indicated: 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed 
in the terms and circumstances of the case but 
without unnecessary detail. The statement of the 
questions should be short and concise and should 
not be argumentative or repetitious. General 
conclusory statements such as "the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or 
facts," are not acceptable. The statement of a 
question presented will be deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only 
the questions set forth in the petition or fairly 
included therein will be considered by the Court. 
(emphasis added) 
The questions presented for review by LDS Hospital were: 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed 
the jury verdict of no causation on grounds 
unrelated to the verdict or the issues raised by 
the parties. 
2 Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled 
that jury instructions 16a and 21a regarding proof 
of negligence and proximate cause misstate Utah law 
and require a new trial. 
These clearly are "general conclusory statements" and an 
insufficient basis on which to grant the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
LDS Hospital also raised arguments in its Petition which are 
not fairly included in the general issues presented. For example, 
at pages 15-16 and 18 of the Petition, LDS Hospital complains that 
plaintiff-respondentfs objections were not adequately preserved at 
trial. Since this question was not specifically set forth, and is 
not "fairly included" in the issues presented for review, it 
should not be considered as a basis for granting certiorari. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSIDERED INSTRUCTIONS 
16a AND 21a AS A BASIS FOR REVERSAL. 
LDS Hospital alleges that plaintiff-respondent's failure to 
object to instructions both given and refused should preclude the 
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Court of Appeal's reversal on that basis. The issue was fully 
briefed and argued. Plaintiff-respondent took the position under 
Rule 51, Utah R.Civ.P, that he was prevented by prejudicial 
judicial proceedings from making a timely objection on the record, 
and that, in any event, a review of the trial court's instructions 
was required "in the interests of justice." The Court of Appeals 
quite apparently agreed, and/or determined, in its discretion 
under Rule 51, to review the errors complained of. 
Since Petitioner made no showing that the Court of Appeals 
abused its discretion in reviewing the erroneous jury 
instructions, that issue can not be the basis for granting 
certiorari. 
C. LDS HOSPITAL MISSTATES THE LAW REGARDING PROOF OF 
CAUSATION. 
1. In a Negligence Action Solely Against a Hospital 
Testimony from a Physician on Causation is Not Required. 
LDS Hospital continues to insist in its Petition, that 
plaintiff-respondent could only prove causation through the 
testimony of a physician. That position was rejected throughout 
the trial by the district court, which specifically allowed 
plaintiff's nurse and respiratory therapist to testify as experts 
on causation. The very same issue was fully briefed and argued at 
length before the court of appeals which also ruled against the 
hospital in its well reasoned and legally supported decision. 
The simple fact of the matter is that no Utah case has ever 
held, in an action solely against a hospital and its staff, that 
testimony from a physician is required to establish causation. 
Plaintiff-respondent's case (as opposed to LDS Hospital's 
defense), had nothing to do with medical diagnosis and treatment. 
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The case had nothing to do with the scientific effect of medicine, 
the result of surgery, or whether the attending physician 
exercised ordinary care. Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 
P.2d 772, 773 (1951); Brief of Petitioner at 13. 
Plaintiff-respondent's duty in this case was to provide 
expert testimony on the standard of care and its breach, which he 
convincingly did. At that point, the issue of whether the 
hospital's negligence resulting in a complete failure to provide 
necessary care was a contributing cause, or a substantial factor 
in the patient's subsequent arrest and death, should have been one 
of fact for the jury. fn2 
The court of appeals agreed with numerous courts from other 
jurisdictions which had considered that specific issue and found 
that physician testimony was not a necessary requirement to 
establish causation. See, e.g., cases cited with approval by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in George 1L* LH£ Hospital [App.7-8], 
including: Utter v. United Hospital Center. 236 S.E.2d 213, 216 
(w.va. 1977); Campbell v. Fitt County Memorial Hospital/ 352 
S.E.2d 902, 908-09 (N.C.App. 1987); Karricran v. Nazareth Covenant 
$ Academy, 510 P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973); Darling v, Charleston 
Community H o s p i t a l , 33 111.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 
1965) ; Goff v . D o c t o r ' s Gene ra l H o s p i t a l . 333 P.2d 29, 33 
(Cal.App, 1958), and see g e n e r a l l y , Morr i s , The Negligent Nurse, 
33 Baylor L.Rev. 109 (1981). A p p e l l a n t ' s Opening Brief , and Reply 
Br ie f before t h e cour t of appeals con ta in d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s of 
many o the r cases and a u t h o r i t i e s . t o t h e same e f f e c t . 
fn2
 This Court need not dwell on this issue, since the court of appeals found 
that plaintiff-appellant had produced sufficient, competent expert testimony 
on causation. [App.6-7] 
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Regardless of whether this point may be legitimately 
disputed, it is nevertheless prejudicial, reversible error for the 
district court to have conducted the trial under rules prohibiting 
the plaintiff-respondent from attempting to prove causation 
through a physician, and subsequently instructing the jury that 
plaintiff-respondent's burden required proof of causation through 
a physician. Fundamental fairness and the interests of justice 
require that plaintiff-respondent be awarded a new trial, and the 
petition for a writ of certiorari be denied. 
2. Plaintiff-Respondent was Entitled to have the Jury 
Instructed on His "Lost Chance of Survival" Theory. 
The court of appeals correctly held that if the negligence of 
the hospital prevented Betty George's doctors from diagnosing and 
treating her condition, the jury could have found that failure to 
be "a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing 
death." [App.9] Here again, the court of appeals decision was 
supported by well reasoned, relevant decisions from other 
jurisdictions. [App.8-9] The law continues to trend in a 
direction favoring "lost chance" causes of action, with logical 
and fair reasoning. 
In Ehlinaer v. Sipes. 155 Wis.2d 1, 454 N.W.2d 754 (1990), 
plaintiffs claimed a physician's negligent failure to diagnose the 
existence of twins resulted in their injuries at birth. 
Plaintiff's expert at trial stated that, had the existence of 
twins been discovered, certain measures would have given the 
mother a chance of prolonging her pregnancy, which may have 
prevented the subsequent injuries. At the close of the evidence, 
the physician was granted a directed verdict on causation which 
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was affirmed by the Wisconsin Circuit Court. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, 
based, in part, on the application of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, §323 (1965) • The Utah Court of Appeals used the same 
rationale in George v. LPS Hospital. [App.8-9, fn.5] The 
Wisconsin Court's reasoning, equally applicable here included 
We disagree that to establish causation the 
Ehlingers must show that proper diagnosis and 
treatment would have been successful. We conclude 
that in a case of this nature, where the causal 
relationship between the defendant's alleged 
negligence and the plaintiff's harm can only be 
inferred by surmising as to what the plaintiff's 
condition would have been had the defendant 
exercised ordinary care, to satisfy his or her 
burden on causation, the plaintiff need only show 
that the omitted treatment was intended to prevent 
the very type of harm which resulted, that the 
plaintiff would have submitted to the treatment, 
and that it is more probable than not the treatment 
could have lessened or avoided the plaintiff's 
injury had it been rendered. 
Causation is a question of fact. (Id. at 759, 
emphasis in the original) 
The Ehlinger court continued, 
In a case such as presented here, where given the 
nature of the malady and omitted treatment the 
success of the treatment if instituted is not a 
matter of reasonable certainty, we refuse to place 
upon the injured plaintiff the burden of proving 
what more probably than not would have happened had 
the defendant not been negligent. 
Greater uncertainty would be involved if an expert 
were required to testify as to what more probably 
than not would have happened had the defendant 
rendered appropriate care. (Id. at 7 61) 
Recall that one of the plaintiff-respondent's objections in 
this case, not reached by the Court of Appeals, was that the 
testimony of the hospital's "experts" on causation was completely 
speculative and without foundation. 
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See also, Aasheim v. Humherger. 695 P.2d 824, 828 (Mont. 
1985), which held, 
We feel that including "loss of chance" within 
causality recognizes the realities inherent in 
medical negligence litigation. People who seek 
medical treatment are diseased or injured. Failure 
to diagnose or properly treat denies the 
opportunity to recover. Including this lost 
opportunity within the causality embrace gives 
recognition to a real loss consequence of medical 
failure. 
In this case, LDS Hospital's negligence deprived Betty 
George of any effective treatment. Depriving plaintiff-respondent 
of a lost chance theory of recovery, would be tantamount to a 
grant of immunity for the hospital's negligence, unless the George 
family could produce speculative testimony regarding what the 
result would have been had that negligence not occurred. Such a 
burden plainly would require proof of the unknowable. The Utah 
Court of Appeals was similarly troubled by the defense asserted by 
LDS Hospital that, "our negligence made no difference." The court 
stated: 
Such an argument is problematic. It would be 
unacceptable, for obvious policy reasons, to permit 
hospitals or doctors to escape responsibility for 
the negligent treatment of gravely ill persons upon 
a showing that the patient's condition was terminal 
and he or she was going to die anyway. [App.7, 
fn.4] 
It is often said that the hospital staff are "the eyes and 
ears" of the treating physicians. The hospital staff is 
undoubtedly a necessary and vital link between a sick patient and 
her opportunity to receive necessary diagnosis and treatment. LDS 
Hospital undertook to perform services for Betty George, who, in 
turn, agreed to pay for them. Thereafter, Betty George had a 
right to expect that the hospital would exercise reasonable care 
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on her behalf regardless of the likelihood of benefit to be 
derived. LDS Hospital now takes the position that it should be 
liable only for omissions which/ if undertaken/ would have had a 
greater than 50% chance of success. Such a positionf if endorsed 
by the courts of this statef would declare open season on 
seriously ill patients/ since doctors and hospitals would be free 
of liability for the grossest malpractice on the rather 
hypocritical assertion that nothing they could have done would 
have made a difference. 
Patients like Betty George go to hospitals not only to 
prevent death/ but also to avoid or lessen the suffering 
associated with injury or disease. A jury should be allowed to 
decide whether a failure of a hospital to procure obviously 
necessary medical assistance/ was a substantial factor in causing 
subsequent injuries which appropriate medical treatment could have 
prevented or ameliorated. The inclusion of that principle by the 
court of appeals in this casef is amply supported both in logic 
and law. [App.7-9] 
CONCLUSION 
In Georae v. LDS Hospital, 142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 1990)f a 
routine negligence case against a hospital, the court of appeals 
correctly perceived the issues, reversed/ and remanded the case 
for a new trial based on 
1. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on 
plaintiff-respondent's theory of the case, which was well 
supported by evidence and competent expert testimony; and 
2. Extremely prejudicial errors in instructing the jury 
on plaintiff-respondent's burden of proof regarding causation/ 
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which differed materially from the burden plaintiff-respondent had 
been held to throughout the trial. 
Since the court remanded the case for a new trial, it did not 
reach several other reversible errors which were committed by the 
trial court. 
In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, LDS Hospital raises 
legal issues not material to the court of appeal's decision, and 
which even if correct, would not effect the propriety of the 
remand. Regardless, LDS Hospital is also incorrect on the law. 
Plaintiff-respondent's negligence action against LDS Hospital did 
not require expert physician testimony on causation. Further, the 
case is a classic example of one which should have been submitted 
to the jury on a "lost chance" theory for recovery. The decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals renders justice, and has ample 
support both in logic and the law. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-respondent David George respectfully 
request that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by LDS Hospital 
be DENIED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this LV day of IvOl/lftbcr , 1990. 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiffs, the husband and heirs of decedent Betty 
George, sought recovery in a wrongful death action against LDS 
Hospital, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, and Dr. Michael Lahey. Plaintiffs 
appeal from a jury verdict finding that defendant LDS Hospital 
was negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but that defendant's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey reached a settlement with the 
plaintiffs prior to trial, although the doctors remained in the 
case for purposes of determining comparative negligence. The 
jury concluded that the doctors were not negligent and assigned 
100 percent responsibility to the hospital. 
to-
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890381-CA 
Plaintiffs* motion for a new trial was denied by the trial 
court. On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error in the jury instructions. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
FACTS 
On July 28
 # 1986$ Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS 
Hospital for a hysterectomy and exploratory surgery. The 
surgery was performed on July 29 without apparent 
complications. On the morning of July 30/ Dr. Lloyd ordered 
that Mrs. George be ambulated four times daily# that she 
receive incentive spirometry1 every hour while awake, and 
that the nurses instruct her to cough and breathe deeply. This 
treatment was intended to increase Mrs. George's breath 
capacity, which is typically depressed following a patient's 
abdominal surgery. 
Mrs. George's breathing deteriorated during July 31. On 
the morning of August 1/ Dr. Lloyd ordered that a chest X-ray 
and lung profusion scan be taken to determine whether Mrs. 
George had a pulmonary embolism. Although these tests proved 
negative for a pulmonary embolism/ they did indicate the 
possibility of bilateral atelectasis.2 In the early 
afternoon of August 1# Dr. Lloyd called in Dr. Lahey and the 
hospital's respiratory therapy department to assist him in 
resolving Mrs. George's pulmonary condition. 
Dr. Lloyd ordered that Mrs. George undergo an angiogram in 
a further attempt to determine whether she had a pulmonary 
embolism. Mrs. George was taken to the intensive care unit 
(ICU) for an angiogram at 10:20 a.m. on August 2. The 
angiogram was completed at about 1:00 p.m./ at which time Dr. 
Lloyd learned that the test result for a pulmonary embolism was 
negative. 
A nurse found that Mrs. George was having difficulty 
breathing, and that Mrs. George was incoherent upon returning 
1. An incentive spirometer measures the volume of air entering 
and leaving the lungs. Use of the device expands a patient's 
diaphragm, while also providing an incentive for a patient to 
breathe more deeply. 
2. Atelectasis is the collapse of an expanded lung, resulting 
in an insufficient flow of air to the lung's air sacs. 
from ICU at 2:20 p.m. She did not inform Dr. Lloyd of this 
condition. The charge nurse telephoned Dr. Lloyd at about 3:00 
p.m. to inform him that Mrs. George had returned to OB/GYN from 
ICU, but she also failed to notify Dr. Lloyd of Mrs. George's 
deteriorating physical and mental condition. 
At 3:00 p.m., another nurse took over the care of Mrs. 
George. This nurse was a one-to-one special-duty nurse, whose 
only assignment was to monitor Mrs. George's condition. At 
about 3:30 p.m., a written notation was made in the chart that 
Mrs. George was disoriented and incoherent. A second-year 
resident physician was unable at this time to determine Mrs. 
George's blood pressure and the nurses had difficulty making 
Mrs. George bleed for a glucose test. Neither Dr. Lloyd nor 
Dr. Lahey were informed of these adverse changes in Mrs. 
George's condition. 
At about 4:00 p.m., the resident physician telephoned Dr. 
Lloyd to tell him that Mrs. George was febrile. Dr. Lloyd was 
not informed during this conversation that Mrs. George 
exhibited symptoms of hypoxia and he did not receive further 
reports until being told of Mrs. George's cardiac arrest. Dr. 
Lahey did not receive any further medical reports until 7:00 
p.m., at which time he also was told that Mrs. George had 
suffered a cardiac arrest. 
The record indicates that the resident physician did not 
visit Mrs. George between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The record 
also shows that the special-duty nurse failed to continuously 
monitor Mrs. George and to notify a supervisor of Mrs. George's 
respiratory distress. Furthermore, the special-duty nurse was 
not even in the room when Mrs. George stopped breathing and 
suffered her first cardiac arrest. 
Mrs. George stopped breathing in front of her visiting 
daughter at about 7:00 p.m. The daughter then had to run out 
of the hospital room in search of a nurse. A code was called 
at 7:04 p.m., in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation was sought 
for Mrs. George. Breathing assistance for Mrs. George was 
initiated at about 7:13 p.m. During the interval between the 
cessation of breathing and breathing assistance being 
initiated, Mrs. George suffered a lack of oxygen to her brain. 
Although her heart beat was reestablished, Mrs. George was 
comatose after the cardiac arrest. Two days later, Mrs. George 
died following a second cardiac arrest. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Two of the trial court's jury instructions are at issue in 
this action. The court's Jury Instruction #16A provided: 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover 
against the doctors or the hospital unless 
it is proven, that, 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey 
or LDS Hospital's nursing staff or 
respiratory therapist or all of them, 
based on a degree of reasonable medical 
probability, failed to exercise that 
degree of reasonable care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff that was 
ordinarily possessed and used by others in 
the respective profession practicing in 
1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar 
communities under similar circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable 
medical probability established through 
expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such 
failure, if any, was the proximate cause 
of the death of Betiy George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the 
heirs of Betty George, and the 
representative of the estate of Betty 
George, was damaged by the negligence, if 
any, of one of the defendants or all of 
them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, all of Lhe foregoing 
propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital, the party or parties, as the 
case may be, against whom any one 
proposition is not found cannot be found 
to have committed medical malpractice and 
your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant or defendants. If you find that 
the evidence is evenly balanced on any of 
the above-mentioned issues, then your 
i 
verdict should be for the defendant or 
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is 
evenly balanced. 
The court's Jury Instruction #21A provided: 
You are instructed that where the 
proximate cause of Betty George's death 
and therefore the injury or loss claimed 
by plaintiff is not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence based on 
reasonable medical probability from 
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left 
to conjecture or speculation and may be 
reasonably attributed to causes over which 
the hospital or doctor had no control or 
responsibility/ then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as 
to proximate causation. 
The jury returned a special verdict finding LDS Hospital 
negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but not finding that the 
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that jury instructions #16A and #21A 
prevented the jury from meaningfully considering the testimony 
of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Plaintiffs also claim that 
jury instructions #16A and #21A precluded the jury from 
awarding damages where the hospital's negligence was only a 
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
The trial court admitted the testimony of plaintiffs' 
.expert witnesses, respiratory therapist Donald Owings and nurse 
Harriett Gillerman, to explain the hospital's duty to Mrs. 
George and the hospital's breach of this duty. Owings 
testified that a respiratory therapist has a duty to notify a 
physician or other supervisor if a patient does not respond to 
respiratory therapy. Based on Mrs. George1s failure to respond 
to the prescribed respiratory therapy, Owings offered his 
expert opinion that the hospital's respiratory therapist 
breached his duty by failing to notify the proper persons of 
Mrs. George's deteriorating pulmonary condition. 
Nurse Gillerman testified that ambulation and incentive 
spirometry are used to prevent and treat atelectasis. 
Gillerman offered her expert opinion that the nurses, in 
failing to follow physician's orders to have Mrs. George 
ambulated and to use incentive spirometry on August 1, thereby 
breached their duty to her. Gillerman also testified that the 
nurses breached their duty by failing to perform a neurological 
assessment of Mrs. George when Mrs. George showed discernible 
signs of respiratory distress or hypoxia and by failing to 
timely notify the doctors of her rapidly deteriorating 
condition. 
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot testify 
about an area of medicine in which he or she is not personally 
familiar. The record clearly indicates, however, that 
Gillerman and Owings testified only to the standards of ^are in 
their respective fields. The trial court recognized these 
witnesses as experts and admitted their testimony, yet the 
court, through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from 
considering their testimony.3 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n appeal 
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents 
questions of law only. Therefore, we grant no particular 
deference to the trial court's rulings.M Ramon By And Through 
Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). The parties in 
this case dispute the trial court's conclusions of law as 
stated in the jury instructions. 
This court has stated that *[i]n medical malpractice 
actions the plaintiff must provide expert testimony to 
establish: 1) the standard of care, 2) defendants failure to 
comply with that standard, and 3) that defendant caused 
plaintiff's injuries." Hoooiiaina v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations 
omitted); s&& Pisflorf v, BicKen, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 
1980). Plaintiff's experts testified as to the hospital's 
standard of care, the hospital's failure through its employees 
to meet this standard, and Mrs. George's subsequent cardiac 
arrest. 
Courts have recognized that "[n]urses are specialists in 
hospital care who, in the final analysis, hold the well-being, 
3. This error was compounded by the court consistently stating 
throughout trial that cause of death was not an issue in the 
case and that expert testimony need not address that subject, 
only to then give a jury instruction focusing on causation as 
established by medical testimony. 
in fact in some instances, the very lives of patients in their 
hands.- Utter v. United HOSP. Center, Inc.. 236 S.E.2d 213, 
216 (W.Va. App. 1977), reh'g denied (1977) (negligent failure 
of nurses to observe plaintiff's condition). Courts have also 
recognized that a nurse may have a duty to notify her 
supervisor that a life-threatening situation exists and that 
failure to perform this duty may be a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's additional injury. See Campbell v. Pitt County 
Memorial HOSP. Inc.. 352 S.E.2d 902, 908-9 (N.C. App. 1987). 
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's 
failure to notify the doctors of Mrs. George's change in 
medical status, which may have indicated either hypoxia or 
sepsis, was a breach of the duty owed to Mrs. George. Tne 
trial court erred in not allowing the jury to base its decision 
on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. See Karriaan v. Nazareth 
Convent fr Academy, ind# 5io P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973), reh'g 
denied (1973) (nurses1 delay in notifying physician of 
plaintiff's condition); see also Darling v. Charleston 
Community Memorial HOSP.. 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 1965), 
reh.'a denied (1965) (nurses failed to recognize and inform 
physician of change in patient's condition, where the condition 
became irreversible within a matter of hours). 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
According to the hospital pathologist, the combination of 
atelectasis, pulmonary embolism, and sepsis probably led to 
hypoxia and this, in turn, resulted in Mrs. George's first 
cardiac arrest and subsequent death. Both parties agreed that 
hypoxia and sepsis were significant contributing causes of Mrs. 
George's death. Plaintiffs' and defendant's expert witnesses 
also agreed that sepsis and pulmonary embolism, produce similar 
symptoms. 
Defendant argues that Mrs. George would inevitably have 
died of sepsis after 2:20 p.m. on August 2, that her septic 
condition was not caused by negligence, and that any negligence 
on the hospital's part was therefore not a proximate cause of 
Mrs. George's death.4 The medical record shows that sepsis 
4. Such an argument is problematic. It would be unacceptable, 
for obvious policy reasons, to permit hospitals or doctors to 
escape responsibility for the negligent treatment of gravely 
ill persons upon a showing that the patient1s condition was 
terminal and he or she was going to die anyway. 
was not diagnosed until August 3, the day after Mrs. George's 
first cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs assert that the hospital's 
negligent failure to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. 
George's deteriorating condition at a minimum contributed to 
her continued deterioration and may have hastened her death by 
depriving her of the chance to receive earlier diagnosis and 
treatment. 
Although defendant asserts that Mrs. George's death due to 
sepsis was inevitable, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Charles 
Elliot, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be 
reversible. Dr. Lewis Weinstein, another of defendant's expert 
witnesses, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be 
treatable, that sepsis did not occur instantaneously in Mrs. 
George's case, and that prompt treatment of sepsis may 
facilitate a patient's recovery. The record therefore does 
support plaintiff's argument that the nurses' failure to notify 
Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's deteriorating condition 
may well have prevented the doctors from timely diagnosing and 
treating her. 
"[E]vidence which shows to a reasonable certainty that 
negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment increased the need 
for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to 
establish proximate cause." James v. United States. 483 F. 
Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Ca. 1980). Another court found the 
defendant's assertion that operating upon the patient in a 
timely manner would not have increased her chance of survival 
unsupported by the record. Sfifi Hicks v. United States, 3 68 
F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). The Hicks court concluded that 
defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery 
she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." 
Id. at 633. 
In a case where the chances of saving a patient's life 
would have been increased if a physician had been timely 
notified of the patient's condition, a court found that whether 
the nonfeasance of the nurses was a contributing proximate 
cause of death was a question of fact. See Goff v. Doctors 
General Hoso. of San Jose. 333 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found error in a trial 
court's jury instructions because of "the unmistakable 
implication in this passage that defendant's negligence had to 
be the sole cause of death in order to bring liability to the 
defendant when, in fact, liability could attach if the 
negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in 
bringing about the death." Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 
1289 (Pa. 1978) reh'g denied (1978)(original emphasis). Hamil 
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a)(196575 
as authority for the proposition that liability may be found 
where negligence increases a party's risk of harm. 
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of 
the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's 
change in condition prevented them from diagnosing, treating, 
and possibly saving her life and that this failure therefore 
was a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing 
death. See Morris, The Negligent Nurse — The Physician and 
the Hospital, 33 Baylor L.R. 109, 116 (1981) (the significance 
of proximate cause as applied to a nurse's negligence). The 
trial court's jury instructions therefore improperly implied 
that the jury could find only one proximate cause of Mrs. 
George's death. 
Based upon the errors arising from the improper jury 
instructions, we reverse and remand for a new trial against 
defendant LDS Hospital. The verdict of no cause of action 
against the defendant doctors is affirmed. 
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(1965) provides that: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if (a) his failure to 
exercise such care increases the risk of 
such harm . . . . 
Because we remand for new trial, it is unnecessary to reach 
the other issues raised by appellant. 
<^2lueJX^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
ADDENDUM II 
The following portions of the record support appellant's position that 
the trial court repeatedly ruled that proof of the medical cause of death (as 
opposed to proof that the conduct of the hospital staff contributed to the 
cause of the patient's initial cardiac arrest on August 2, 1986) was not at 
issue or irrelevant. This section also demonstrates how the trial court 
violated its own ruling. After specifically instructing appellants' counsel 
not to ask his experts their opinion on cause of death, the Court later 
allowed respondent's experts, who were not involved with Mrs. George's care or 
the determination of her cause of death, to testify on that subject. The 
narrow medical cause of death, separate and apart from the conduct of the 
hospital staff as a contributing cause, became, in fact, the focus of 
respondent's defense. 
R-7 65 at 323-25: (Testimony of appellant's expert Don Owings.) 
Q. [Russell] Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is 
included in the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10? 
A. [Owings] Yes. 
Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient 
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor. The document speaks 
for itself. 
The Court: It is in evidence isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: No. Mr. Burbidge — 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave 
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of 
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and death— 
did you rely in part on the autopsy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What in that autopsy supports your opinion? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, again, hearsay. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Russell: Your honor, an autopsy — 
The Court: Would you like to approach the bench? 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical 
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Those records are blood gas reports? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you see the report at 7:12, at the bottom of the page? 
A. It says 1912. 
Q. That's 7:12 
A. Right. 
Q. That would be during the code procedure? 
A. According to the record, yes. 
Q. What does that indicate about whether or not the patient 
was receiving oxygen? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and 
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic. 
Q. Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen 
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor, competency and 
foundation. 
The Court: Sustained. Is there a motion to strike? 
Mr. Burbidge: Yes, your Honor. 
The Court: Granted. 
Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the 
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the 
response comes back? 
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess. 
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record. 
(The following proceedings occurred in chambers.) 
The Court: The record will reflect that counsel and the 
Court are in session, out of the presence of the jury. For 
the record, the Court has previously ruled that the 
cause of death may not be testified to except for 
someone who in and official capacity participated 
in determination of cause of death. You may 
proceed. 
R-765 at 327 
The Court: Is Counsel suggesting, by virtue of that 
argument, that if cause of death becomes an issue, one who 
signs a death certificate is competent to testify as to 
cause of death? 
Mr. Russell: Not necessarily, your Honor. I think there 
would be a lot of circumstances where the person who signs 
the certificate doesn't know. Was just told, wrote it down 
and signed it. 
The Court: That's the Court's precise observation. 
Mr. Russell: The way I understand it, the Court is 
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about 
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at 
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows — he can 
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death. 
The Court: Not the cause of death. He had already 
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the 
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The 
question was, did it contribute? The answer was, 
in his opinion, it did contribute. There is 
nothing wrong with the question nor the answer. The 
last question posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did 
it cause the decedent's death? It is an inappropriate 
question, and the Court has previously ruled on it. That's 
the reason the Court sustained the objection and granted the 
motion to strike. 
1 -* 
R-765 at 328-331 - Conference in Chambers: 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting that, A, 
cause of death is an issue in this case. The Court 
has never taken that position. But if you contend 
that it is an issue, . . . 
Mr. Russell: I don't think it is. 
The Court: I don't think it is, either. I don't 
think it is an issue as opposed to a 
contributing cause. 
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard on the matter, your Honor? 
The Court: As opposed to a contributing cause. 
Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a 
contributing cause? 
The Court: The Court has permitted counsel to ask that 
question. 
Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our 
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a 
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that 
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We 
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through 
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I an just unsure in 
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying, 
in order to — because we do have the burden to prove 
that, that violations of the standard of care 
contributed to the cause. 
The Court: The record is replete at this point 
with both of your expert witnesses on that. 
Mr. Russell: I want to make sure that — 
The Court: Isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: I think so. 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel 
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense 
or rebuttal. The Court is suggesting, in its own 
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue. You 
have talked all along in this case about standard of care, 
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called 
from Southern California have been designated or 
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with 
the standard of care. And they are perfectly within 
their right as an expert witness to say if the 
standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect 
as an expert, that this is what would occur. But 
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did 
happen to this particular woman. 
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard, please, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: I would move for a mistrial at this 
time, and the basis of the motion is that 
prejudicial testimony, incompetent testimony, and 
testimony without foundation has come in with 
regard to the cause of death and the contributing 
causes of death. In the State of Utah, medical doctors 
are restricted — such issues are restricted to the 
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority 
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a 
medical doctor is the exclusive — or the determination of 
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the 
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of 
medical doctors. And the Court's ruling, allowing these 
unqualified experts to testify as to a contributing cause of 
death, is a prejudicial error that cannot be corrected 
through any kind of instruction to this jury, and I would 
move for a mistrial at this time, and request the Court give 
direction to counsel for the plaintiff that he is not to 
pursue that line of questioning with these witnesses again. 
The Court: The motion for mistrial is denied. The 
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor 
any other expert witness who was not involved in 
determination of cause of death could not so 
testify. And the Court has granted defense counsel's 
motion to strike. Further, if there is a problem, and 
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the 
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it 
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable. 
Anything further? 
Mr. Russell: No, your honor, thank you. 
The Court: The Court will, on the record instruct 
counsel not to ask this witness nor any other 
expert witness as to the decedent's caur.e of death, 
who did not participate in making that 
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding on 
that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the 
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the 
Court's position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff 
again. 
NOTE: Following the repeated assertions of this position, the Court 
subsequently allowed Dr. Trowbridge, Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Elliot - none of 
whom had provided any care to the patient, nor did they have any involvement 
with the determination on cause of death - to offer their purely speculative 
.opinions on that very subject. Worse, in instructions 16A, 21A and the 
Special Verdict Form, the Court required plaintiff to prove the cause of death 
through a physician or recover nothing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the 
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that, 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of 
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability, 
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in 
carirg for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used 
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar 
circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability 
established through expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty 
George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George, 
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants 
or all of them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or 
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition is 
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice 
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or 
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defendants. If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on 
any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be 
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is 
evenly balanced. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of 
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by 
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence 
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a 
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may 
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or 
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate 
causation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where the evidence demonstrated that the hospital staff 
failed to alert physicians to changes in the medical condition of 
Betty George requiring immediate medical diagnosis and treatment, 
did the trial court commit reversible error by requiring appellant 
to produce expert testimony as to causation? Stated another way, 
was this not a case "obvious to laymen", in which the jury could 
have found negligence and causation without the necessity of 
expert testimony? 
2. In a case alleging negligence against LDS Hospital, did 
the trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury 
that proof of causation could only come from expert physicians, as 
opposed to nursing and respiratory therapy experts? 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing or 
refusing to submit to the jury, appellant's proposed instructions 
which set forth his theory of the case, which was supported by 
competent evidence? 
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error by inserting 
the previously rejected instructions 16A and 21A into the final 
set of instructions on the last day of trial, after both sides had 
rested, immediately before closing argument? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling 
appellant's objections that LDS Hospital's physician expert's 
testimony as to causation was speculative, and without foundation? 
In the same respect, did the trial court commit reversible error 
when it violated its own specific ruling, and allowing the 
respondent's experts to testify as to cause of death. 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying 
appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. 
Lahey? 
7. Lid the Special verdict form, submitted to the jury over 
appellant's objections, constitute reversible error? 
8. Did the trial court's denial of appellant's right to 
present rebuttal argument constitute prejudicial error? 
9. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
denied appellant's motion for a new trial? 
10. Was it error for the trial court to award respondent 
costs associated with the taking of depositions pursuant to Rule 
54(d), Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure? 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate 
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line. If 
there'is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the 
proposition, indicate by finding "yes." If there is 
preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate 
by finding "no." If there is no preponderance of the evidence 
either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no." 
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the 
questions propounded to us, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes No x 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was.the negligence 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George Stnd the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2 
A, Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER:- Yes No 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes ^ No 
B. If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer 
the following question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital 
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by 
David George and the heirs of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you answered f,nofl to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no 
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions. 
QUESTION NO. 4 
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,. 
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? This question 
should be answered only if you answered f,yes" to question No. 3A and 3B. 
General Damages 
a. loss of consortium $ 
b* Pain and suffering of Betty George $ 
Special Damages iiicluding: 
ai Funeral and Burial expenses $ 
b. Medical expenses $ 
c. Lost income, benefits and household services $ 
QUESTION NO. 5 
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent, 
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of 
negligence is attributed to: 
a. Dr. Kimball Lloyd % 
b. Dr. Michael Lahey % 
c. LDS Hospital, its nurses 
and/or respiratory therapists 
% 
Total 100 % 
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fully tried and resulted in a verdict and judg- trial to determine amount of damages was 
ment for the defendant, the court's later ruling proper since, in personal injury action, q\ 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss was a tion of how accident happened, who was 
nullity and the plaintiff could not appeal there- fault, and pain and injury occasioned then 
from but should base any appeal upon the ver-
 a r e ^ mterraingled that if trial is ordered, 
diet and judgment and the rulings refusing to f^mes* to both parties, it should be on atf 
P.2d 855 (1953).
 1 3 4 4 2 ? p M ? 3 6 ( 1 9 6 7 ) 
—Splitting of negligence and damages is- « . . . « . , „ . 
sues . Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 47| 
Judgment n.o.v. in favor of patient in per- < U t e h 1 9 8 1 >; J e P s e n v- Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 4g 
sonal injury action against hospital on the <Ut»h 1 9 8 2>; Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. C h j | 
question of negligence and ordering of new man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R34 §5 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et 1330. 
8 € i , « *****.*, .* ~~ — Right to voluntary dismissal of civil actio! 
direction of verdict on opening statement of ***** *««f t» S 6 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. Key Numbers.—Judgment** 199; Trial 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 167 to 181. 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury pn 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of ita 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate tha t such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive t h i | 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object* 
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore-' 
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
.instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 1986 amend- ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-to-
ment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during last sentence; and substituted "jurors" for 
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence, ^jury" in the second sentence in the second 
made a minor punctuation change in the sec- paragraph. 
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Compiler's Notes. — This section varies Cross-References. — Exceptions unneces-
-jbatantially from Rule 51, F.R.C P., after sary, Rule 46. 
^juch it is patterned. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Comments on evidence. 
^Allowed and disallowed. 
—proper. 
——Accurate statement of facta. 
Copy of instructions. 
—Delay. 
Meaning. 
.-Entire context. 
Hecessity of objections. 
—Failure to object. 
Appellate review. 
— Burden of overcoming. 
Court's failure to instruct. 
Waiver. 
—Opportunity to object. 
Effect of denial. 
—Purpose of rule. 
—When made. 
After jury retired. 
Before jury retires. 
During trial. 
Oral instructions. 
—Necessity. 
—Preservation by court reporter. 
Specific instructions. 
—Comparative negligence. 
Legal consequence of jury's findings. 
—Contributory negligence. 
Irrelevant instructions. 
—Elements of criminal offense. 
One instruction. 
—Proximate cause and superseding cause. 
—Refusing requested instructions. 
Correct statement of law. 
Unreliability of eyewitness identification. 
—Theories of parties. 
Instructions as a whole. 
Supported by evidence. 
—Unavoidable accident. 
Specificity in objections. 
—Cure 
Later motions or briefs. 
—Insufficient. 
—Specificity required. 
Explanation of grounds. 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
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Comments on ev idence . 
—Allowed and disallowed. 
This rule does not prevent the trial court 
from including in its instructions general 
statements concerning certain types of evi-
dence, nor concerning the burdens of proof and 
the sometimes varying degrees of proof re-
quired; however, this rule does enjoin it from 
commenting on the quality or credibility of the 
evidence in such a way as to indicate that it 
favors the claims or the position of either 
party. State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 
P.2d 270 (1972). 
—Proper. 
In suit for damages for false representations, 
where one of plaintiffs was a director of defen-
dant company, the trial court's outlining to the 
jury of the duties of a director was not im-
proper. Douglas v. Duvall, 5 Utah 2d 429, 304 
P.2d 373 (1956). 
Accurate statement of facts. 
In suit for damages arising out of a truck 
accident, instructions relating to the effect of 
meeting an automobile a t nighttime and stat-
ing tha t the burning lights on an oncoming 
automobile obscure objects behind it, included 
an accurate s tatement of facts susceptible of 
judicial knowledge as a matter of law and was 
not comment on the evidence or expression of 
opinion. Federated Milk Producer's Ass'n v. 
Statewide Plumbing & Heating Co., 11 Utah 
2d 295, 358 P.2d 348 (1961). 
Copy of instructions. 
—Delay. 
The furnishing of a copy of the instructions 
to counsel is a convenience and courtesy to him 
and, where there may have been some delay, 
but counsel did get his copy during the time 
the instructions were being given and used the 
same in taking his exceptions, the delay in fur-
nishing a copy would not be ground for rever-
sal. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 
P.2d 564 (1960). 
Meaning. 
—Entire context. 
Instructions should be read in their entire 
context and given meaning in accordance with 
the ordinary and usual import of the language 
as it would be understood by lay jurors. 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 
451 (1966). 
Necessity of objections. 
—Failure to object. 
Appellate review. 
A review of error as to the giving or failure 
to give an instruction where no objection was 
made will be done only under unusual circum-
stances and where the interests of justice 
urgently so demand. Williams v. Lloyd, HJ 
Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166 Q965). 
The Supreme Court may, in its discretion 
and in th > m e r e s t of justice, review the giving 
or failure to give needed structions even i | 
the defense has failed to make request for inn 
structions in writing. State v. Bell, 563 P.2$ 
186 (Utah 1977). 
Burden of overcoming. 
The burden of showing special circumstance* 
which would warrant a departure from the rule 
precluding appellate consideration of a claimed 
error in giving or refusing of instructions not 
objected to rests upon the party seeking to vary 
from the rule. McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 
364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954). 
A party may not assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he ob-
jects thereto, and the objection must be suffi-
ciently specific to give the trial court notice of 
the claimed error; while Supreme Court may in 
its discretion and in the interests of justice re-
view the giving or failure to give an instruc-
tion, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party' 
to present a persuasive reason to invoke such 
discretion. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Incr 
v. W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1983). 
Where plaintiff did not object below, it can-
not raise the failure to give special verdicts or 
interrogatories on appeal where plaintiff has 
not met its burden of showing special circum-
stances warranting such a review. Cambelt 
Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. * 
(1987). 
Court's failure to instruct. 
Where defendant submitted no instruction to 
the court, claim of error as to court's failure to 
instruct as to "practical acceptance" was with-
out merit. Romrell v. W.W. Clyde & Co., 534 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1975). 
Although the trial court in a prosecution for 
theft could have instructed on the value of the 
property taken, its failure to do so in the ab-
sence of a written request did not warrant re-
versal. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 
1977). 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff failed to make an objection 
to trial court's refusal to give requested in-
struction to jury, Supreme Court would not re-
view refusal on appeal. Beck v. Dutchman Co-
alition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P.2d 867 
(1954). 
Where objections urged on appeal were not 
urged in the trial court they were not consid-
ered by the Supreme Court. Steele v. Wilkin-
son, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117 (1960). 
Plaintiffs who failed to object to jury instruc-
tion at time of trial were precluded from rais-
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ing issue on appeal. Morgan v. Pistone, 25 
Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970). 
Where e opt ions to instructions were taken, 
by agree i of court and counsel, after jury 
had been cructed and had retired to deliber-
ate, and defendant failed to request instruction 
on entrapment, trial court was justified in not 
including such an instruction. State v. Cowan, 
26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). 
In order for a party to take advantage of a 
failure to give a correct instruction, he must 
have proposed a correct instruction and ob-
jected to the trial court's failure to give it. 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). 
A party may not assign as error the giving of 
or failure to give an instruction unless they 
object thereto before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict. Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 
(Utah 1977). 
Even if requested instruction should have 
been given, plaintiff could not complain of the 
failure to give it for the reason tha t he did not 
except to the court's failure to give that partic-
ular instruction. Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 
179 (Utah 1978). 
—Opportunity to object. 
Effect of denial. 
The parties have a right to make objections 
to the instructions to preserve challenges to 
their accuracy, but under the rule that, if a 
party has no opportunity to object, the absence 
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice 
him if counsel was prevented from making ob-
jections to instructions, he should be deemed to 
have done so. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 
2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
Any error in court's failure to give counsel 
opportunity to object to instructions was harm-
less error where no showing was made that 
any instruction was improper. Pagan v. Thrift 
Citys Inc., 23 Utah 2d 207,460 P.2d 832 (1969). 
—Purpose of rule. 
Purpose of requiring tha t trial court instruc-
tions be objected to in order to preserve any 
error on appeal is to give the tr ial court an 
opportunity to correct any errors or fill any in-
adequacies in the instructions given so that the 
jury may consider the case on the proper basis; 
in order to accomplish that purpose, the Rule 
should be strictly enforced unless to do so 
would create a substantial likelihood of injus-
tice. State v. Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976). 
—When made. 
After jury retired. 
Common practice of taking exceptions to in-
structions after jury has been instructed and 
retired to deliberate is ill advised because it 
gives trial court and opposing counsel no op-
portunity to correct errors or omissions which 
may be pointed out. State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 
2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971) 
Before j u r y retires. 
The primary purpose of the requirement that 
objections to instructions be made "before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict" is that if the 
objections call attention to error, correction 
may be made before the jury goes to deliberate. 
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 
(1962). 
During trial. 
The trial judge should be allowed consider-
able latitude of discretion with respect to ..ie 
mechanics of procedure, and should not be held 
in error for requiring counsel to submit pro-
posed instructions during the course of the 
trial and before he rested his case. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 
(1960). 
O r a l ins t ruc t ions . 
—Necessity. 
It is sometimes necessary to instruct a jury 
orally in order to answer problems which are 
essential to the jury's having a clear view of 
the evidence and the issues as the trial pro-
ceeds. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. 
v. ' e e n , 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
—Preservation by court reporter. 
There is no error in giving an oral instruc-
tion to the jury when the instruction is taken 
down and preserved by the court reporter. 
State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah 1974). 
Specific ins t ruc t ions . 
—Compara t ive negl igence. 
Legal consequence of j u r y ' s f indings. 
The main function of a jury is (to be a fact 
finder; and, in a comparative negligence case 
tried under Idaho law, it would have been prej-
udicial error to instruct the ju t as fco the effect 
of its findings on the outcome of the case 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P 2d 
423 (Utah 1974). 
If requested, a trial court must inform th€ 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence il 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con 
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart , 65* 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
—Contributory negligence. 
Irrelevant instructions. 
Where the trial court took the question o 
the plaintiffs contributory negligence from th< 
jury because he was only six years old bu 
then, in other instructions on proximate cause 
made reference to the effect of "the acts am 
omissions of two or more persons" rnd 'th< 
negligent acts of two or more persons," ever 
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though there was some justification for the 
charge that irrelevant instructions were given, 
the issues were presented to the jury fully and 
fairly and there was no prejudice to the rights 
of the plaintiff Hadley v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 366, 
345 P.2d 197 (1959). 
—Elements of criminal offense. 
One instruction. 
All the elements of the charged crime need 
not necessarily be included in one instruction, 
though the better practice is to do so; so long as 
the jury is informed what each element is and 
tha t each must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the instructions taken as a whole may 
be adequate even though the essential ele-
ments are found in more than one instruction. 
State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). 
—Proximate cause and superseding cause. 
In case where plaintiff was injured while rid-
ing as passenger in jeep that collided with de-
fendant's bus, it was improper for trial court to 
instruct jury tha t the jeep driver was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident if he was negli-
gent in failing to see the bus, since defendant's 
negligence was not superseded by any negli-
gence on the part of the jeep driver if the lat-
ter's negligence was foreseeable. Harris v. 
Utah Tranwit Auth., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
—Refusing r e q u e s t e d ins t ruc t ions . 
C o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of law. 
The triaS court may properly refuse to give 
requested instructions correctly stating the 
law when t heir substance is given in the in-
structions cif the court. Hardman v. Thurman, 
121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951). 
Unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion. 
Trial court, in a criminal prosecution did not 
err in refusing to give a requested instruction 
cautioning t h e jurors about the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification. State v. Sanders, 27 
Utah 2d 3£4, 496 P.2d 270 (1972). 
—Theories of parties. 
Instructions as a whole . 
It is the du ty of the trial court to cover the 
theories of both parties in its instructions. In 
determining whether the court adequately dis-
charged thi's duty and fairly presented the is-
sues to the jury, the instructions must be con-
sidered aft a whole. Startin v. Madsen, 120 
Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951). 
Supported by ev idence . 
Par t ies are entitled to have their theories of 
the case presented to the jury in the form of 
instructions only if they are supported by the 
evidence Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 567 P 2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
—Unavoidab le acc iden t . 
An instruction on unavoidable accidents, in 
most cases, is superfluous in view of the other 
instructions which are given covering the basic 
issues in accident cases. Wellman v. Noble, 12 
Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). 
Specificity in object ions . 
—Cure . 
La te r mot ions o r briefs . 
Expansion on non-specific objections in a mo-
tion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal does 
not cure the lack of timeliness in making 
proper objections to the trial court. Beehive 
Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 
859 (Utah 1983). 
—Insufficient. 
"On the grounds and for the reasons that 
such instruction is not supported by, and is 
contrary to, the law and the evidence" does not 
comply with the requirements of this Rule. 
Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 
123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953). 
Objection to instruction on grounds that it is 
confusing, misleading, and contrary to the law 
fails to point out with the requisite degree of 
particularity wherein the instruction erred; 
since the purpose of the rule is to direct the 
attention of the court to any errors in the in-
struction, the objecting party must state dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
grounds of his objection. Redevelopment; 
Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 (Utah 1974). 
In order to assign as error the giving of an 
instruction, a party must object to the instruc-
tion, and the objection must be specific enough 
to give the trial court notice of the very error in 
the instruction of which the party complains;' 
objections stating that an instruction "is not a 
correct statement of the law involving the 
case" and that instructions are "not supported 
by any evidence in the record" are not specific 
enough to put the trial court on notice of the 
claimed error. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. 
Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983). 
Objection failed to meet the requirements of 
this rule where it pointed to different para-
graph of instruction than tha t challenged on 
appeal and where objection merely stated that 
the instruction was "not a correct statement of 
law" without citing code section it later relied 
on, in appeal, without specifying with particu-
larity the ground for objection. Godesky v. 
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
An objection couched in language such as 
"the instruction is not suggested by and is con-
trary to law," or like terms, lacks the specific-
ity required by this rule. Morgan v. Quailbrook 
Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
—Specificity r e q u i r e d . 
An objection to an instruction should be spe-
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cific enough to bring to the attention of the 
court all claimed errors in the instructions and 
to give the court an opportunity to correct 
them if the court deems it proper. Employers' 
Mut Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 
253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953). 
_—Explanat ion of grounds. 
To appeal the giving or the refusal of an in-
struction, a party must properly object to the 
instructions in the trial court and explain its 
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the 
instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
-^Failure to tender. 
.—-Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 1 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Tho 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Mei 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 
(1964); Memmott v. United States Fuel Co 
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telfoi 
Newell J. Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 I 
2d 270, 480 P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. ^ 
Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 i 
356 (1973); McGinn v. Utah Power & L 
Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974); Henderso 
Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamki 
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. I 
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Cor 
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (L 
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (L 
1986); Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (L 
1987); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (U 
1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 75 Am. Jur . 2d Trial § 573 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 CJ .S . Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agi 
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil c 
commenting on weight of majority view or 
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigei 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of 
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules maki 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform i 
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on 
temative theories of negligence or breach 
warranty, where instruction on strict liabil 
in tort is given in products liability case, 
A.L.R.3d 102. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, constn 
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51 , and si; 
ilar state rules, tha t counsel be given opport 
nity to make objections to instructions out 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial •=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52, Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with a 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately il 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rul 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall sim 
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute th 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes c 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be givei 
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